

## **The Political and Community Context of Immigrant Naturalization**

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## **Abstract**

Becoming a citizen is a component of a larger process of immigrant incorporation into U.S. society. It is most often treated as an individual-level choice, associated with such personal characteristics as the duration of residence in the U.S., age, education, and language acquisition. This study using microdata from Census 2000 in conjunction with other measures at the level of community areas, states, and nations, is designed to examine collective aspects of naturalization. It probes for characteristics of the community and policy context that influence individual outcomes. The results confirm previous research on the effects of individual-level characteristics on attaining citizenship. They offer strong evidence of collective effects, and they show that both the varied political histories of immigrant groups in their home country and the political environment that they encounter in the U.S. have significant impacts on their propensity of naturalization.

## The Political and Community Context of Immigrant Naturalization

Becoming a citizen is a component of a larger process of immigrant political incorporation into U.S. society.<sup>1</sup> Naturalization is partly an individual choice, and individual characteristics such as educational attainment, income, ability to speak English, and length of time in the United States are well-established positive predictors of immigrant naturalization (Liang 1994; Jones-Correa 2001; Yang 1994a, 1994b; Cho 1999). These are similar to the predictors of other dimensions of social incorporation or assimilation of immigrants (Alba and Nee 2003), and the effects of socioeconomic status are consistent with those found in studies of political participation by the general population (Verba et al 1993).

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<sup>1</sup> Naturalization can be acquired by a foreign-born national who meets certain requirements, stipulated in the Immigration and Nationality Act, concerning age (at least 18 years), lawful admission, and residence in the United States (at least 5 years). Additional requirements include the ability to speak, read and write the English language; knowledge of the U.S. government and U.S. history; and good moral character. There are also special provisions of naturalization law that exempt certain applicants from one or more of the requirements of the general provisions. Spouses and children of U.S. citizens and military personnel constitute the main category of special naturalization. Prior to 2000 (the year of our data) adopted children and children immigrating with their parents had to apply for citizenship along with their parents' application. This changed with the Child Citizenship Act of 2000, which stipulated that children and spouses of U.S. citizens automatically become citizens if they are lawful permanent residents (Simanski and Rytina 2006). Immigration law is complex and changing, and many persons rely on attorneys or advisors from community organizations to assist them in the naturalization process.

This study focuses particularly on *collective* influences on naturalization. Our analysis updates and expands on studies showing that while individual variables have significant effects on naturalization, characteristics of the country of origin as well as the host community also play a significant role (Yang 1994a; Liang 1994; Jones-Correa 2001a; Bueker 2006). Immigrants do not confront the question of citizenship only as individuals, but also through shared experiences with those who came from the same country, who have settled in the same community, and who share their race and ethnic background. These common characteristics are at the heart of the variations in the context of origin and reception through which Portes and Rumbaut (1990) portray the immigrant experience.

Differences by race and ethnicity (comparing non-Hispanic white, black, Hispanic, and Asian immigrants) – if they are not explained by compositional differences – suggest one such collective influence. Shared characteristics of immigrants' neighborhoods, such as racial/ethnic concentration, may have additional effects. We find that ethnic concentration and the citizenship choices made by other residents significantly influence naturalization. Because one of the most important consequences of naturalization is the ability to participate in electoral politics, we also examine community effects on naturalization that may demonstrate ethnic mobilization. That is, there may be anticipation that gaining citizenship will allow more effective political participation in some communities than in others, depending on the circumstances.

In the broader literature on immigrant assimilation, dealing with behaviors ranging from language acquisition to residential mobility, researchers have often looked for collective processes but rarely with a political content. We argue (see also Pantoja and Gershon 2006; Bloemraad 2002) that the process of obtaining citizenship is distinct from most forms of immigrant incorporation precisely because of its political nature. It is an outcome of engagement

with political institutions, and it is driven by expectations about political rights and opportunities above and beyond social or economic benefits. As Jones-Correa (1999) aptly puts it, “Clearly, from immigrants’ point of view, the state still matters.” Following from this perspective we study several explicitly political predictors of naturalization. We add to the evidence that immigrants from nation-states with restrictive political institutions are less likely to become citizens, and we offer new findings that the restrictiveness of the electoral system of an immigrant’s state of residence (voter ID policies) impacts naturalization.

## **COLLECTIVE EFFECTS ON IMMIGRANT NATURALIZATION**

Despite its importance as a dimension of immigrant incorporation and its significance for U.S. public policy, recent review conclude that naturalization has been neglected in immigration research (Bueker 2006; Johnson et al 1999 cited by Pantoja and Gershon 2006). Nevertheless, as noted, several studies show that variables such as educational attainment, income, ability to speak English, age, residential mobility and length of time in the United States are positive predictors of immigrant naturalization. There is unanimity in the literature on the effects of these characteristics, in full accord with assimilation theory. Studies of collective influences on naturalization have not been as numerous or conclusive as those analyzing individual level predictors. Our purpose here is to contribute to the literature on this less developed aspect of citizenship.

### **Community Influences on Immigrant Naturalization**

Several studies build on the theoretical proposition that social contacts of various sorts—whether with co-ethnics, immigrants, or predominantly native-born groups—shape attitudes, behaviors,

and thus the propensity to naturalize (Liang 1994). They have assessed the role of the following variables at various geographic scales in shaping immigrants' likelihood of naturalizing: residential location (metropolitan vs. rural location); population size or density; ethnic or racial concentration; racial residential segregation; the density and population size of the immigrant population; and the ethnic or racial mix of the population, (Liang 1994; Yang 1994a, 1994b; Bueker 2006; Portes and Curtis 1987).

A central collective factor is racial/ethnic group membership. Perhaps because naturalization is an issue only for immigrants, or because many studies have concentrated on a single major grouping (such as Hispanics), studies of naturalization have been surprisingly silent on the issue of racial/ethnic differences. On other aspects of political behavior, such as electoral participation, race is treated prominently and studies find persistent gaps in levels of political participation across different racial groups (Uhlener et al. 1989; Bobo and Gilliam 1990; Verba et al. 1993; Ramaskrishnan and Espenshade 2001; de la Garza 2004; Segura and Bowler 2005; Yang 1994b). These researchers suggest that race matters for political participation beyond what can be explained by compositional differences. Racial group membership may influence political participation for a variety of complex reasons: race may represent the unique political culture or political history of a group; it may represent a kind of collective identity or political consciousness that can be conducive to political activity or mobilization or lack thereof; it may be reflective of group specific resources; and it could also be seen as a marker of the experience of discrimination (Rodrigues and Segura 1996; Wong et al 2005). Where (naturalized) immigrants are included in studies of political participation, they appear to conform generally to the behavior of natives with the same race and ethnicity.

Yang (1994a), using microdata from the 1980 census, specifically focuses on variation in naturalization rates across racial/ethnic groups. He offers two main competing hypotheses. The “discrimination” hypothesis is that minority immigrants (that is, all except non-Hispanic whites) will encounter greater barriers to naturalization and will be deterred from following the steps toward citizenship by a fear of rejection. He notes, for example, that until the 1950s Asian immigrants were treated by U.S. law as ineligible for naturalization. The “forced self-protection” hypothesis also presumes that minority immigrants encounter discrimination, but posits that they respond by seeking citizenship to improve their legal standing. Both of these approaches emphasize minority status and they anticipate differences between non-Hispanic white immigrants and all other immigrants, though in opposite directions. A more specific “cultural differences” hypothesis is that Asians, due to Oriental culture in general and the influence of Confucianism in particular, will be reluctant to cut ties to their ancestral homelands by becoming U.S. citizens. Yang finds that immigrants of all three minority groups are less likely to acquire citizenship than non-Hispanic white immigrants. But after controlling for individual-level differences in education, English language ability, and other factors, they are significantly and substantially more likely to naturalize. Hence he concludes that the forced self-protection hypothesis is confirmed. Other studies (Yang 1994a, 1994b; Bueker 2006) further demonstrate differences by national origin within major racial/ethnic categories.

Table 1 reports analyses of the five percent microdata sample from Census 2000 (weighted to yield full population counts) showing citizenship status across racial/ethnic and age groups. The table reiterates what is already well known about the share of immigrants in the population. Among white and black adults well under 10% are foreign-born, while immigrants

are a majority of Hispanics and more than three quarters of Asians. This means that naturalization has special importance for Hispanics and Asians.

Table 1 about here

Less than half of the foreign-born population (40.3%) has naturalized. Non-Hispanic white and Asian immigrants are most likely to be citizens, followed by blacks and by Hispanics at a much lower level (27.7%). Most relevant to current electoral participation is citizenship among persons aged 18 and above, the second panel in the table. Only 30.1% of Hispanic adult immigrants are naturalized citizens, compared to the national average of 42.9% for all adult immigrants. Levels of naturalization are much lower in the under-18 population, only 17.0% overall. In this age group Asians have the highest level (27.7%), more than double the rate for Hispanics (11.0%). One goal of this study is to determine whether these gross difference across groups remain when other individual and collective characteristics are taken into account.

Many immigrants live in communities with large shares of foreign-born residents who share their racial or ethnic background. There is contradictory evidence suggesting that residential segregation could either promote or retard naturalization. A common view is that residential contact with native whites can reflect or lead to greater social-cultural assimilation and increased access to information about U.S. society, which enhances the likelihood to naturalize. Liang (1994) and Bueker (2006) both present this argument. They also suggest an alternate theory (see also Portes and Curtis 1987, Pantoja 2005): contact with native born Americans or whites can result in experiences of discrimination, which could (if they do not lead to withdrawal) stimulate greater interest in naturalization as a means to contest discrimination. Hence Jones-Correa (2001a) suggests the anti-immigrant sentiment pervasive in California in the 1990s might equally have retarded or stimulated naturalization and political participation by

immigrants in that state (it appears to have reduced naturalization but increased voting turnout).

Does ethnic concentration or segregation lead to civic withdrawal or does it engender social capital, ethnic competition or conflict, and collective identity – all of which could promote naturalization?

Three studies provide mixed findings on the effect of concentration of the foreign-born or co-ethnic population. Measured at the level of the metropolitan region, the percentage foreign born is negatively related to naturalization (Bueker 2006). Measured at the level of the state, the proportion of members of the same ethnic group who have naturalized is positively associated with naturalization (Yang 1994a), and the overall share of group members in the state is positively related to naturalization for Asians (Yang 2002).

Two studies have examined the effects of segregation from whites (measured with the Index of Dissimilarity at the level of metropolitan regions). Liang (1994) uses 1980 census microdata to show that lower segregation from whites generally leads to higher odds of naturalization. This effect is larger for Mexican immigrants than for other groups, and the opposite relationship is found for Chinese. Bueker (2006), however, using Current Population Survey data from around 2000, does not find significant effects of segregation on naturalization for blacks, Hispanics, or Asians. One study included information about the specific neighborhood where Mexican immigrants lived. Portes and Curtis (1987) found that Mexican immigrants living in communities with lower proportions of non-Hispanic whites were less likely to naturalize than those Mexicans living in communities with a higher proportion of whites.

## **Political Institutions and Naturalization**

Portes and colleagues have stressed the importance of the “context of reception” for a number of immigrant outcomes, though without explicitly addressing political incorporation or naturalization (Portes and Rumbaut 1990; and for the second generation, Portes and Zhou 1993). Bloemraad (2002 and 2006) has described more fully the importance of national policies in her comparison of naturalization rates for immigrants in the U.S. and Canada. She argues that both material and symbolic support for immigrants, as expressed in and stipulated by national policies, is responsible for the high levels of immigrant naturalization in Canada as compared to similar immigrant groups in the U.S. Pantoja and Gershon (2006) also suggest that political institutions could significantly influence immigrant propensity to naturalize. Their analysis of the Harvard/Kaiser/Post National Political Latino Survey shows that Latinos who have a “positive political orientation” or generally positive feelings about the U.S. political system are more likely to naturalize than those who don’t. This finding is consistent with recent findings that naturalized immigrants—particularly Latinos—are more politically active than their native born co-ethnics (Barreto et al 2005; Barreto 2005). Those who naturalize, in this view, are pre-screened for political interest.

What are the varying features of the American political system that promote or hinder positive feelings for immigrants in particular? One recent study (Van Hook, Brown, and Bean 2007) shows that the policy environment toward immigrants at the state level – including specific policies that can restrict public assistance to non-citizens as well as broad measures of public attitudes – influence naturalization. To the extent that naturalization is an instrumental decision geared to position the individual with respect to services, a restrictive policy environment may affect the incentive to become a citizen. On the other hand, a welcoming

attitude toward immigrants on the part of local residents could also be an encouragement to citizenship as a step toward assimilation.

A related factor could be an immigrant group's representation in the political process, through elected or appointed public officials. Bobo and Gilliam (1990) put forward a hypothesis of "political empowerment," arguing that voting is encouraged by increased numbers of black elected officials – actors who can promote mobilization, demonstrate its efficacy, and enhance feelings of solidarity and pride. Whether there may be similar effects on naturalization has not previously been studied.

The political empowerment hypothesis goes beyond the concrete incentives for citizenship, such as welfare eligibility, to questions of pride, group solidarity, and belief in collective efficacy. Some authors have suggested that specific rules about voting and registration at the state level can be proxies for the overall openness and accessibility of political institutions, and in turn play an important role in shaping political participation (Jones-Correa 2001a; Ramakrishnan and Espenshade 2001). It is another large theoretical step to suggest that electoral rules could influence the decision to naturalize, because this hypothesis seems to require that immigrants be familiar with the details of the political system even prior to becoming citizens. Another possibility, however, is that people are influenced by collective sentiments about whether the right to vote makes a difference, and in some contexts immigrant rights groups or other organizations may be the "informed intermediary" through which opinions are formed. Jones-Correa's (2001a) analysis of the 1996 naturalization data from the Current Population Survey finds that state-level political variables have significant impacts on naturalization rates. In addition to the "contextual effect" of living in California (referred to above), he shows that immigrants who live in states with more "liberal" voting rules (allowing mail-in ballots, having a

longer period of registration prior to the election date, or not requiring re-registration) are more likely to naturalize.

One dimension of voting regulations that has recently drawn considerable attention is requirements for voter identification. Scholars from the Eagleton Institute of Politics, Rutgers University, and the Moritz College of Law, Ohio State University (2006) have shown that stricter voter identification requirements depress voting turnout in 2004 and that this effect is especially pronounced for minority voters (Eagleton 2006). The issue of voter ID has been pressed particularly by the Bush Administration's effort to draw attention to voter fraud involving non-citizens, undocumented aliens, or other without the right to register to vote, a political strategy that has been described as "vote suppression" (New York Times Editorial Board 6/14/07). If state voter ID requirements depress voter turnout, do they also discourage naturalization?

The impacts of social and political context are not confined to immigrants' experience in the U.S. Bueker (2006) suggests that from a rational choice perspective immigrants coming from greater distances or from repressive regimes are more likely to naturalize than are those from closer or more democratic countries because the costs of return are higher for them. Support is found for the effect of distance by Portes and Curtis (1987) and Yang (1994a; 2002). They argue, for example, that low naturalization by Canadians and Mexicans is due to their likelihood of returning home more often and maintaining political ties to their home country. Yang (1994a) finds that immigrants from socialist and refugee sending countries have higher propensities to naturalize. Bueker (2006) shows that immigrants from politically restrictive countries also are more likely to become citizens. In addition, pointing to high rates of naturalization by Cuban refugees, who were historically targeted to receive financial aid from the

U.S. government, Bueker suggests that the benefits immigrants receive upon arrival in the United States may also have an effect.

Another institutional feature of an immigrant's country of origin relevant to naturalization is legal recognition of dual citizenship. Bloemraad (2002) argues that this variable is not likely to be significant, because official prohibitions to dual citizenship are often not enforced in practice (2006). Yang (1994a) argues that if dual citizenship is allowed, immigrants can only stand to gain from acquiring U.S. citizenship. However, unexpectedly, he finds that the effect is in the opposite direction. Jones-Correa (2001a, 2001b) finds the expected positive effect. He also suggests that the political processes involved in establishing dual citizenship laws matter. For example, Latino immigrants from countries which instituted dual citizenship as a process of consultation with and lobbying from their immigrants abroad (Colombia, Ecuador, the Dominican Republic, and Mexico) are the most likely to naturalize.

## **RESEARCH DESIGN**

The theoretical discussion above suggests the possible salience of macro-level or contextual factors such as community composition and political institutions in the country of origin and in the U.S. However the results are often mixed, and some of the most relevant studies are based on data from two or three decades ago. Our approach is to examine individual and contextual factors together in a comprehensive analysis of immigrants from all origins in 2000. Most research on this question focuses only on specific ethnic/racial groups, typically Hispanics or Asians (Aguirre and Saenz 2002; Alvarez 1987; Baker 2000; Jones-Correa 2001a and 2001b; Pachon 1987; Pantoja and Gershon 2006; Pantoja 2005; Pantoja et al 2001; Portes and Curtis 1987; Sierra et al 2000; White et al 1993; Yang 2002). Exceptions are studies by Bueker (2005

and 2006), Yang (1994a and 1994b), Woodrow et al (2004), and Liang (1994). We pool together immigrants from all backgrounds in order to estimate a general model of naturalization. We then estimate specific models for each major group, which allows us to test for group-specific collective effects.

### **Data Source and Sample**

The analysis relies on the 5 percent Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS) of the 2000 U.S. census (IPUMS 2004). This dataset has the advantage of being both nationally representative and large enough for analysis of foreign-born members of all major ethnic and racial groups. The PUMS also makes it possible to define contextual variables at a finer geographic scale than the state or metropolitan region, the level of measurement in prior research. In the PUMS data, the place of residence is reported for Public Use Microdata Areas (PUMAs). A PUMA typically contains approximately 100,000 persons, so that major metropolitan centers are subdivided into many PUMAs.

Despite the advantages of the census microdata, they have limitations in the study of naturalization processes. The main issue is that there is no information on the year in which a person became a citizen. In extreme cases, an elderly foreign born person in the microdata sample may have naturalized decades ago, and yet in this cross-sectional analysis we use as predictors their characteristics (and characteristics of their social context) in 2000. On the other hand, immigration increased sharply in the 1980s and 1990s, so that most foreign born persons in the sample are relatively recent immigrants, and the majority of them immigrated as adults. For these persons we might expect a strong correlation between their situation at the time of naturalization and current characteristics. In the absence of comparable samples in which

longitudinal or retrospective information can be analyzed, the census microdata offer a useful starting point for research.

A more specific concern with this data source is that it does not distinguish between legal and illegal immigrants and therefore includes undocumented migrants who are not eligible for citizenship.<sup>2</sup> We address this limitation by including for the first time in a study of naturalization an occupation measure that has been to be strongly associated with legal status (Passel and Clark 1998; Passel 2005). Although undocumented immigrant workers can be found throughout the workforce, they tend to be over-represented in certain occupations.

The multivariate analysis is restricted to the immigrants who were 18 years old and above in 2000, the age at which they were required to apply for citizenship on their own behalf and unrelated to their parents' applications. Another sampling restriction is by household. PUMS data include all household members, creating potential problems of autocorrelation in estimating multivariate models. Our procedure is first to select all immigrants of a given racial/ethnic category and then randomly to select one person in that category from each household to include in a given analysis.

## **Variables**

Table 2 summarizes the variables used in the analysis. Citizenship status (i.e., naturalized citizen or non-citizen) is the dependent variable. The analysis utilizes four broad racial categories, constructed from two different variables—race and Hispanic origin. Hispanic origin is understood by the Census to be a reflection of ethnicity rather than race, and therefore the

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<sup>2</sup> According to Passel et al. (2004)'s estimation, the number of illegal immigrants in the country is 9.3 million. They represent 26 percent of the total foreign-born population.

Census determines Hispanic identity and racial identity separately. We combined these two variables to construct four racial categories that structure much of our analysis: non-Hispanic white, non-Hispanic black, Asian and Hispanic. A respondent who self-reports within any of the Hispanic origin categories is treated as “Hispanic” regardless of race. Only those individuals reported to be white alone, but did not indicate any Hispanic identity, were considered to be non-Hispanic white. Those individuals reported as black (alone or in combination with any other race) but not Hispanic were considered to be non-Hispanic black. Asians are those reported as Asian (alone or in combination with another race except for black) and not Hispanic.

Table 2 about here

### *Individual-level predictors*

Indicators of adaptation that are closely associated with assimilation theory include length of residence in the United States, English speaking ability, and age at immigration. Years in U.S. are represented in five categories in order to detect nonlinearity. English speaking ability indicates whether the respondent speaks only English at home and also how well (in four categories) the respondents who also speaks another language at home speaks English. Age at immigration is computed as actual age minus the years of U.S. residence.

Income and education are included as indicators of socioeconomic status. Household income, originally a continuous variable, was reconstructed as a categorical variable with five categories in order to assess nonlinearity. Dummy variables were created to reflect categories of education. (An important technical detail is that, because education is reported only for persons aged 25 and above, the age categories of 5-15 and 16-24 are must be interpreted both as categories of age and as persons without a reported education.)

Two other measures represent what studies refer to as rootedness in the United States (Portes and Curits 1987; Bueker 2003): marital status and number of children. Marriage is thought to increase stability and social networks and having children suggests a greater level of commitment to remaining in the United States (Bueker 2003 and 2006). We also control for gender, since previous studies show that women are more likely to naturalize than men (Pantoja and Gershon [2006] for Latinos; though Bueker [2005 and 2006] reports that this effect is inconsistent and varies by national origin).

Occupation variables are included as a partial control for illegal status. We employ the occupation measure developed for this purpose by Passel and Clark (Passel and Clark 1998; Passel 2005). Using the 1998 Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) in the PUMS file, 22 specific occupations in which illegal immigrants are highly represented (e.g., drywall/ceiling tile installer, grounds maintenance workers, food preparation workers, etc.) and whose proportion of illegal immigrants exceeds the proportion in the workforce (4.3 percent) are classified as having high probability of being illegal. High-level professional occupations (such as physicians, lawyers, and engineers) and protective service occupations (such as police and firefighters) that require licensing are classified as having zero probability of being illegal immigrants. Passel (2006) has validated these categories with results of survey research among immigrants whose status was legalized under the amnesty provisions of the 1990s.

#### *Country of origin and state policy factors*

Some collective variables are tied to the country of origin, which we code based on reported place of birth. One of these is political repressiveness. The Freedom House has developed rankings of countries in terms of civil liberty and political freedoms and updated the

rankings every two years since 1972 (<http://www.freedomhouse.org>). They combine the two measurements to create an overall score (as a 3-point scale) of the country's degree of civic and political freedom. We create dummy variables based on the current classification that indicate whether a birth country is free, partly free, and not free. Another national-level political variable is provision for dual citizenship based on the reports of national policies provided by the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (2001).

We include two measures of the policy environment at the state level, applying indicators previously found to be associated with naturalization. One is the availability of welfare services to non-citizens, or the social policy "safety net" for immigrants, an index developed by Zimmerman and Tumlin (1999) in a Working Paper of The Urban Institute (see also Van Hook, Brown and Bean 2007). This measure reflects immigrant access to benefits in 12 separate social policy areas, including post-1996 access to TANF, Medicaid and Food Stamps. The original measure categorizes states into four levels of safety net availability. We collapse these into two categories, the least restrictive states (where the safety net is "most" and "somewhat" available) vs. the most restrictive ("less" and "least" available). We found the same pattern of results when we used all four of the original categories, and we report the simplified variable here. Another indicator of the state policy environment is "immigrant receptivity," a measure of public attitudes originally developed for metropolitan areas by DeJong and Tran (2001) and DeJong and Steinmetz (2004) based on data from the General Social Survey in the years 1995 to 1997. This measure was expanded to the state level and converted to standardized scores by Van Hook, Brown, and Bean (2007).

A measure of co-ethnic office holding is available from a directory prepared by the National Association of Latino Elected and Appointed Officials (NALEO). The NALEO

directory includes elected and appointed public officials at all levels, and provides their official postal address (NALEO 2000). We linked zip codes to the PUMAs defined in our Census 2000 data file, drawing on the linkage between zip code areas and PUMAs by the Missouri Census Data Center Geographical Correlation Engine (MABLE Geocorr 2000). Where a zip code crosses PUMA boundary lines, we credited the office holder to both PUMAs according to the share of the zip code in each PUMA. We report here the effect of a simple dichotomy distinguishing PUMAs with no Latino office holder from those with at least a share of one office holder. In exploratory analyses we experimented with other ways of operationalizing this variable, including treating it as an interval scale or dividing it into multiple categories, which yielded the same result.

Some political variables associated with electoral policies are measured at the state level, because most voting requirements are regulated by state governments (see Yang 2002; Jones-Correa 2001a; Ramakrishnan and Espenshade 2001). Indicators of states' early voting and liberalized absentee voting policy are drawn from Hansen (2001). A variable not used before as a predictor of naturalization is voter identification policy, which we derive from a report published by the Election Reform Information Project, conducted in conjunction with Electionline.org and The Constitution Project (2006). Because of its novelty, we describe it in more detail here.

The question is whether or not a respondent lives in a state requiring prospective voters to show some form of personal identification before casting a ballot. We consider this to be an indicator of overall political openness that may directly or indirectly shape immigrant propensity to naturalize. Forms of identification required or requested may include photo or non-photo ID. According to the Election Reform Information Project, 11 states require "some form of documentary proof of eligibility and/or identity in order to vote" (2002: 10), though this form of

ID may vary and there also may be variation in policies that govern what a poll worker should do in the case a prospective voter does not have an ID. States that do not require or request any form of ID have varying requirements and procedures for verifying the identify of potential voters, including having them state their name, sign their name, or matching a signature with a signature on record with election officials. The Election Reform Information Project (2006) classified state requirements as of 2000.

The original classification used by the Election Reform Information Project had five categories. We collapsed these into a simple dichotomy based only on the maximum requirement: does the state require documentary evidence at the polls of the prospective voter's identification? These categories do not take into account other procedures (sometimes called "minimum requirements") to be employed when voters do not meet "maximum" identification requirements, nor do they account for rules specific to absentee voters, election-day registrants (where allowed), first time voters or those who have registered by mail (see Eagleton and Moritz 2006 for discussion of minimum vs. maximum requirements). They also do not reflect variation in voter identification policies that may exist at local (sub-state) jurisdictions.

### *Community context*

Finally some predictors are characteristics of the population based on the PUMA of residence. One weakness of extant studies that consider community context is the unit of analysis employed. The choice of a unit of analysis is known by geographers as the Modifiable Areal Unit Problem (Openshaw 1984), because findings may vary depending upon the unit of analysis employed. Following Bueker (2006), we hypothesize that community composition is a proxy for social networks, inter-group relations, inter-group contact, and targeted efforts at mobilization by

outside actors that often take place at a very local level. Bueker herself, because her analysis is based on the Current Population Surveys, could not identify areas smaller than metropolitan regions (MSAs). By virtue of its smaller size the PUMA is likely to reflect better the social environment of people's daily lives (though PUMAs themselves are not small, averaging about 100,000 residents). To illustrate this point Figure 1 maps the percentage of naturalized citizens among Hispanics aged 18 and over in each PUMA in the State of New Jersey. (These figures are based on microdata aggregated to the PUMA level). PUMA boundaries are indicated in dark gray; these are overlaid with Metropolitan Statistical Area boundaries (PMSA/MSA). This map shows that metropolitan regions can be internally very heterogeneous and suggests the advantage of working at the PUMA level.

**Figure 1 about here**

This study includes three community-level variables measured for PUMAs: the isolation index, percentage of adult naturalized citizens, and household income ratio. These are all group-specific (for whites, blacks, Hispanics, and Asians). The percentage of foreign-born group members who are naturalized citizens is calculated from the microdata. Because it is theoretically related to the group's potential voting power, we limit the calculation to group members age 18 and over. This variable is included in each group-specific model. In the model pooling all four groups, it is also included, and its value represents the naturalization rate for the group of each sampled person. The isolation index is a measure of the extent to which group members are exposed only to one another in the census tract where they live. Hence it reflects both the relative size of the group in the PUMA and the degree of residential segregation from other groups across census tracts within the PUMA. The index is computed from tract data in Summary File 1 from Census 2000. Finally, income ratios (based on median household income)

are calculated for each minority group (including immigrants and non-immigrants) relative to that of the non-Hispanic white population in the PUMA. The isolation index and income ratio are substantively meaningful only for the minority groups, and they are therefore only included in the three minority group-specific models.

## **RESULTS**

Multivariate logistic regression is employed to analyze the effects of the explanatory variables on the probability of citizenship, a dichotomous variable. In our initial analysis, we estimate a single pooled model of all racial/ethnic groups (Table 3). Dummy variables represent each group category to identify effects of racial group membership. We also present models for four distinct sub-samples of cases from each racial group (Tables 4-7). There are two versions of each logistic regression model. The first estimates the effects of individual characteristics on citizenship, including race and Hispanic ethnicity; the second incorporates both individual and collective effects.

### ***Individual-level predictors***

The effects of individual-level predictors in Model 1 of each equation are strong and are not much affected by the addition of collective predictors in Model 2. Although these variables are not the focus of this study, they are the most consequential predictors, and it is essential to understand their effects. Here we review these effects as shown in Model 2 of each equation and point out some differences in their effects across groups that have not been noted in prior research.

**Age.** Older persons are more likely to be naturalized. Among non-Hispanic whites this difference is very large: those 55+ have about seven times the odds of naturalizing than those in the 25-55 range. The effect is smaller but in the same direction for blacks. Among Asians, there is little difference between those 41-55 and 55+, but those in the younger categories have odds as little as half of the 55+ group.

**Gender and Family.** Women's odds of naturalization are higher than men's by a factor of 10-27%, except among white immigrants. For whites, women are less likely to become citizens. Hispanic married persons are more likely to naturalize; for all other groups, they are slightly less likely. For all groups except Hispanics, there is a modest increase in likelihood of naturalization for each co-resident under-18 child in the household; the effect of children is negative for Hispanics.

**Years in USA.** For members of all racial/ethnic groups, persons with 6-10 years residence are two to five times more likely than newer arrivals to be naturalized. This is not surprising, since most immigrants face time constraints in eligibility for naturalization. But there continue to be very large differences with every increment in duration. The positive impact of duration of residence in the U.S. is particularly pronounced for Asians.

**Age at immigration.** Another related variable is age at immigration, treated here as an interval scale. Independent of age and duration of residence, people who arrived in the U.S. at an older age are slightly but significantly less likely to be naturalized, perhaps reflecting their stronger identification with their country of origin.

**Language.** The passage from sole reliance on one's native language is expected to be closely and naturally linked to time. English language ability can also be a prerequisite to naturalization, and learning English can be viewed as an indicator of desire to become more connected to the

new environment. Among Hispanics, blacks, and whites there is little difference in attaining citizenship between those who speak only English at home, those who speak English well or very well. The effects of language on naturalization appear at lower levels of language ability: compared to those who do not speak English at all, those who speak it “not well” have twice or more the odds of naturalizing, and the odds for those who speak better are even greater. Results for Asians show increases at every step of language ability.

**Education.** There is a simple monotonic relation between education and naturalization for whites and blacks – the higher the education level, the more likely to be naturalized. Results are more complex for Hispanics and Asians. For Hispanics the exception to the monotonic pattern is for those with graduate education – they are more likely to naturalize than those with high school or less, but less likely than those with some college or a college degree. Among Asians, it is this same group that creates the exception – and in this model those with graduate education are surprisingly less likely than any other category to naturalize.

**Income.** The reference category for income is people with very low incomes, below \$14,999. We have included several categories here to test whether the effect of income is monotonic, and we find that it is not. The general pattern is that those with incomes just above the lowest category are least likely to naturalize, and those with higher incomes are more likely. But among blacks the category with the highest income is least likely to naturalize, and whites at any income over \$15,000 are less likely to naturalize than those in the lowest category. Income has smaller and less consistent effects than education.

**Home Ownership.** Homeownership is significantly associated with naturalization, though more for Hispanics, Asians, and blacks (increasing the odds by 50-60%) than for whites (an increment of only about 20%).

**Occupation.** Occupational categories have been constructed as a proxy for likelihood of being undocumented. These work as expected for Hispanics, Asians, and Blacks. In other words, immigrants who are employed in occupations with high odds of being undocumented are less likely to naturalize. However in the non-Hispanic white model, both the “high risk” and “low risk” categories are negatively associated with naturalization. This result calls into question the generalizability of past studies of the relationship between occupation and legal status of immigrants. Apparently it is more common for white immigrants with high professional standing to choose not to become citizens.

### *Collective-level predictors*

We turn now to the effects of measures of collective characteristics that are the main focus of this study. The foremost of these is race and ethnicity. Table 3 shows that naturalization rates differ greatly across the four major groups. After controlling for individual characteristics such as age, years in U.S., income, and education, Asian and black immigrants are substantially and significantly more likely to naturalize than white immigrants (Table 3, Model 1). This reverses the white advantage shown in the gross naturalization rates in Table 1. Hispanics are somewhat less likely to naturalize than whites. However, after controlling for community and political context, there is a marked change in the Hispanic coefficient: Hispanics are shown to be more likely to naturalize than White immigrants, as are Asians and blacks (Table 3, Model 2).

Evidently these other collective factors have a significant effect for Hispanic immigrants. In particular, additional analyses (not reported in Table 3) reveal that the percentage of naturalized co-ethnics at the PUMA level is what explains Hispanic’s apparently lower propensity to naturalize. In other words, after controlling for the share of naturalized group members in the

community, which has a depressing effect for Hispanics, being Hispanic is no longer negatively associated with naturalization.

The relationships revealed in Model 2 are consistent with Yang's "forced self-protection" hypothesis – that seeking citizenship is a means of empowerment for immigrants who find themselves in a minority status in the U.S. In this respect, even though the act of seeking citizenship is usually carried out by individuals acting on their own, it is a form of collective group action, and it could be expected to be responsive to the political and community context in which immigrants live. The other collective variables introduced in Model 2 for Tables 3-7 provide a more specific test of this view. The answer is affirmative, but some effects vary by group.

**Percent of Naturalized Coethnics.** A strong contextual effect in these models is the impact of the share of other immigrants of the same racial/ethnic background who have naturalized. Net of one's own characteristics, is there an additional pull toward naturalization if many co-ethnic immigrants have done so? Clearly there is. In our models, for every percent increase in the share of coethnic immigrants who are naturalized, the respondent's odds of naturalizing increases by 2.3% overall, and between 1.9% (Hispanics) and 2.9% (blacks) for specific groups. Hence even a ten percent difference in naturalization among coethnics would have a substantial impact.

**Ethnic Isolation.** Ethnic isolation (that is, living in an area with a higher probability that the respondent has many coethnic neighbors and less exposure to other groups) decreases propensity to naturalize for Hispanics, blacks, and whites. But surprisingly it has the opposite effect for Asians. Although these coefficients are small, the difference between living in a PUMA where 10% of neighbors are coethnic and one where 70% are coethnic would be sizable.

**Average Group Income.** Where immigrant group members' incomes tend to be more on par with those of a standard reference category (we use the incomes of U.S. born non-Hispanic whites for comparison), we would expect group members to be more likely to naturalize. This is the result for Hispanics, but the opposite is found for black and Asian immigrants. Unexpectedly where black or Asian coethnics are relatively poor compared to whites in the surrounding area, black and Asian immigrants are more likely to become citizens. (This variable is not included in the equations for white immigrants.)

**Political regime in country of origin.** One motive for attaining U.S. citizenship for those who experienced repressive regimes is protection against the government of the country of origin. This is our consistent finding for all groups when we compare the most repressive category of regimes vs. non-repressive regimes. (However for blacks the effect of coming from a “partly free” country is negative). In the pooled sample the odds to naturalize are 77% greater if one is from a repressive country. This is a very strong effect for all but blacks, and it is strongest for whites.

**Dual citizenship.** Availability of dual citizenship reduces the odds of naturalization by 18% in the pooled sample. This effect holds for all groups except for Hispanics. For Hispanics from countries that allow dual citizenship, the odds of naturalizing are 16% higher than the odds for those from countries without this possibility. (This result is heavily influenced by the weight of Mexicans among Hispanic immigrants; Mexico allows dual nationality, and for this reason is treated here and by other scholars [e.g., Jones-Correa 2001b] as allowing dual citizenship.) For other groups, the odds of naturalization for immigrants from countries which recognize dual citizenship are 14-25% smaller than the odds for those from countries which do not accept dual citizenship. One might have expected dual citizenship to promote becoming a U.S. citizen, since

doing so does not involve losing one's original identity. But as Yang (1994a) pointed out, immigrants might perceive dual citizenship as an added burden or responsibility rather than a benefit. Or perhaps it is inherently difficult to maintain dual allegiance to both the country of origin and the host country.

### **Policy environment**

The models include two measures of the policy environment at the state level, and the Hispanic model also includes a dummy variable for presence of Latino office holders at the finer geographic level of the PUMA. In the pooled sample, immigrants in states with less restrictiveness of services to non-citizens are less likely to naturalize, an effect that is statistically significant but small – increasing the odds of naturalization by 1%. This suggests that there may be an instrumental motive for citizenship. The group specific models show that this effect is actually much stronger for minority immigrants. There is no significant coefficient for whites. But the effect of less restrictiveness for other groups is to reduce the odds of naturalization by from 5% (Hispanics and Asians) to 14% (blacks).

If a less restrictive policy with respect to services reduces an inducement to citizenship, a welcoming attitude on the part of the public increases propensity to naturalize in a small but statistically significant way. In the pooled model a one standard deviation increase in the receptivity index (a large difference in the absolute value of the scale) increases the odds of naturalizing by about 1%. This effect is significant for all groups, least for whites and blacks (where the effect is less than a 1% increase in odds) and most for Hispanics and Asians (where the odds increase by 2%).

Contrary to expectations, presence of a Latino office holder at the PUMA level is actually negatively associated with propensity for Hispanic immigrants to become citizens. Because this

is the first time that a measure of political representation has been used in a study of naturalization, we are hesitant to draw a strong conclusion. The finding may be another reflection of the capacity of immigrants to demand public services even without becoming citizens, similar to the social policy safety net index. But it is surprising in light of our initial expectation that this variable might be an indicator of political mobilization by the immigrant community, or the possibility that communities with higher rates of naturalization would be more likely to be able to elect or secure the appointment of a Latino public official.

**State level electoral and political institutions.** We include three institutional variables to represent whether state law encourages electoral participation. The first two reflect the availability of absentee voting and early voting. In the pooled sample, easier absentee voting retards naturalization, but early voting increases it. These effects are not significant for all groups, and an exception is a negative effect of early voting for whites. In light of much public debate about the effects of voter ID requirements, it is significant that these requirements tend to suppress naturalization by immigrants. The negative impact of voter ID requirements is particularly pronounced for Hispanics, reducing their odds of becoming a citizen by 15%.

## **DISCUSSION**

This study partly verifies results from previous research about the effects of individual-level predictors of attaining citizenship. Particularly age, years in U.S., English speaking ability, and education have consistently strong impact on the likelihood of becoming a naturalized U.S. citizen. We have nevertheless found unexpected differences across groups in the size and direction of these effects. It is especially puzzling that being a woman or having a “low risk of being undocumented” occupation promotes naturalization except among whites, and that being

married reduces naturalization while having children promotes naturalization except for Hispanics.

Our principal interest in these individual-level variables is to learn to what extent compositional differences among racial/ethnic groups affect their rates of naturalization. This effect is strong indeed. Non-Hispanic white immigrants are much more likely than the average immigrant to be citizens (over 50%), and Hispanics are by far the least likely (barely above 25%). Yet after controls for individual background characteristics Asian and black immigrants have much higher odds of naturalization than do whites, and the addition of further controls (especially the naturalization rates of other coethnics in the same urban area) leaves whites as the least likely to naturalize. This inversion of the naturalization hierarchy offers support for the theory that seeking citizenship not only reflects people's incorporation into American society as individuals, a process of assimilation, but also in important ways is a collective behavior. In terms of Yang's alternate hypotheses of immigrants' response to minority status in this country, it gives more weight to viewing citizenship as a resource by which immigrants hope to protect themselves.

This collective perspective is further reinforced by the impact of whether others in the surrounding community are seeking to become a citizen on the behavior of individual group members, which is significant even for white immigrants. The effect of ethnic isolation for Hispanics, blacks, and whites can be interpreted in a similar vein – where immigrants live in relative separation from members of other racial/ethnic groups, they may be less aware of discrimination and feel less need for a collective defense. (This could have turned out the other way, that isolation supports group mobilization. Our finding may hinge on a typical low level of political awareness in immigrant communities.) Hispanic, black, and white immigrants all tend

to live in PUMAs where they are a majority of the population, so high levels of isolation for these groups imply near-homogeneity of coresidents (the mean levels are 75% white for whites, 46% black for blacks, and 45% Hispanic for Hispanics). Asians are present in much smaller numbers in most places (average of 18% Asian in the PUMAs where they live), and the average Asian immigrant lives in a majority-white area. Perhaps as a result even one of the higher levels of residential isolation for Asians does not reach the threshold level at which separation would reduce awareness of discrimination. Because we (like most other researchers in this field) do not have more direct information on perceptions and motives, this interpretation is only an indirect inference. Still, residential patterns are shown here to have significant effects, and these effects point in the direction of collective rather than atomized behavior.

The same conclusion is supported by the effects of restrictiveness of assistance to non-citizens and public attitudes toward immigrants at the state level. Immigrants are more likely to naturalize in states that are less generous in services toward non-citizens, suggesting a collective and instrumental motivation for citizenship. And they are more likely to naturalize where natives are more welcoming toward them.

Some other collective variables do not have the effects that the literature predicts. Presence of Latino office holders predicts lower rather than higher propensity to naturalize. There are mixed results for the group's income relative to whites, for availability of dual citizenship, and for absentee and early voting regulations at the state level. But there are two explicitly political conditions that make a difference. One is the character of the government in the country of origin. All else equal, immigrants from politically repressive countries are much more likely to seek citizenship in the U.S. The other is state-level voter identification requirements. Because citizenship is just one step, and an early step, toward political

participation, it may seem unlikely that immigrants considering citizenship are looking ahead to the conditions under which they could freely take part in elections. It would be surprising if many immigrants even knew what the identification requirements are. And yet for every group, not only for minorities, this institutional variable has a significant impact. We do not know enough about electoral procedures to be sure how to interpret the effect. Possibly voter identification rules are a proxy for rates of voter registration or voting, or for the strength of immigrant organizations in state politics, for the receptiveness of the institutional and political climate or another similar phenomenon that could be salient in immigrants' lives. Our results open new questions for research on citizenship, and they suggest that citizenship needs to be studied in a larger political context.

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
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**Figure 1. Percentage Naturalized 18+ of Hispanic Immigrants by PUMA, New Jersey, 2000 (with PMSA boundaries shown in black)**



**Table 1. Nativity and Citizenship by Age and Race/Ethnicity, 2000**

	Total	Native citizen	Naturalized Citizen	Non-citizen	% Citizen of foreign-born
All ages					
Non-Hispanic White	194,527,123	187,682,147	3,728,091	3,116,885	54.5%
Non-Hispanic Black	35,237,875	33,064,583	971,487	1,201,805	44.7%
Hispanic	35,204,480	21,072,230	3,917,885	10,214,365	27.7%
Asian	11,886,283	4,444,223	3,693,427	3,748,633	49.6%
Other race	4,566,145	4,025,242	223,042	317,861	41.2%
Total	281,421,906	250,288,425	12,533,932	18,599,549	40.3%
Age 18 and above					
Non-Hispanic White	150,488,985	144,134,950	3,628,743	2,725,292	57.1%
Non-Hispanic Black	23,934,416	21,991,077	920,830	1,022,509	47.4%
Hispanic	22,956,194	10,560,032	3,726,855	8,669,307	30.1%
Asian	8,751,867	2,016,716	3,497,736	3,237,415	51.9%
Other race	3,168,140	2,690,153	210,074	267,913	43.9%
Total	209,299,602	181,392,928	11,984,238	15,922,436	42.9%
Age under 18					
Non-Hispanic White	44,038,138	43,547,197	99,348	391,593	20.2%
Non-Hispanic Black	11,303,459	11,073,506	50,657	179,296	22.0%
Hispanic	12,248,286	10,512,198	191,030	1,545,058	11.0%
Asian	3,134,416	2,427,507	195,691	511,218	27.7%
Other race	1,398,005	1,335,089	12,968	49,948	20.6%
Total	72,122,304	68,895,497	549,694	2,677,113	17.0%

Source: IPUMS (2000)

**Table 2. Description of Variables**

Variable	Measurement
Dependent Variable	
Citizenship	Non-citizen (ref), compared to citizen
Independent Variables	
Individual characteristics	
Age	Age 55+ (ref), compared to: 5-15, 16-24, 25-40, 41-55
Sex	Male (ref), compared to female
Years in U.S.	0-5 years (ref), compared to 6-10, 11-15, 16-20, 21+
English competence	Does not speak English (ref), compared to speaks not well, speaks well, speaks very well, speaks only English
Household income	Less than \$15,000 (ref), compared to \$15,000-39,999, \$40,000-74,999, \$75,000-99,999, \$100,000 and more
Education	More than BA age 25+ (ref), compared to other categories age 25+: Less than high school, High school grad, Some college, BA or associate
Age at immigration	Years
Number of children	Number of children in the household
Marital status	Not Married (ref), compared to Married
Homeownership	Renter (ref), compared to owner
Occupation	Other occupations (ref), compared to unemployed, occupations with zero probability of being illegal immigrants, occupations with high probability of being illegal immigrants
Collective characteristics	
Isolation index	Group-weighted average percent of the group proportion in a PUMA
Percentage voting age immigrants	Percentage of naturalized and age 18 + persons out of total foreign-born population
Income ratio	Ratio of group median household income to non-Hispanic white median household income
Repressive country	Free (ref), compared to partly free, not free
Dual citizenship	No dual citizenship (ref), compared to dual citizenship allowed
Receptivity	Index of public attitudes toward immigrants aggregated to states (standardized score)
Immigrant safety net availability	Index of availability of state welfare support to immigrants treated as a dichotomy, less restrictive (ref) compared to more restrictive
Latino office holding	Number of Latino office holders in PUMA, none (ref) compared to at least one
Absentee vote policy	Absentee vote restricted (ref), compared to liberalized absentee vote policy
Early vote policy	No early vote (ref), compared to early voting allowed
Voter ID policy	No voter ID requirement (ref), compared to voter ID required

**Table 3. Logistic Regression Estimates for Predicting Citizenship Acquisition: All races (2000)**

		Model 1				Model 2			
		B	Sig.	S.E.	Exp(B)	B	Sig.	S.E.	Exp(B)
<b>Race</b>	Non-Hispanic white (ref)								
	Non-Hispanic black	0.312	***	0.003	1.367	0.463	***	0.003	1.588
	Asian	0.504	***	0.002	1.655	0.495	***	0.002	1.641
	Hispanic	-0.196	***	0.002	0.822	0.405	***	0.002	1.499
<b>Individual variables</b>									
Age	Age 55+ (ref)								
	Age 41-55	-1.246	***	0.005	0.288	-1.245	***	0.005	0.288
	Age 25-40	-1.331	***	0.003	0.264	-1.287	***	0.003	0.276
	Age 18-24	-0.889	***	0.002	0.411	-0.856	***	0.002	0.425
Sex	Female	0.122	***	0.001	1.130	0.115	***	0.001	1.121
Marital status	Married	-0.019	***	0.002	0.981	-0.013	***	0.002	0.988
Number of children		-0.005	***	0.001	0.995	0.005	***	0.001	1.005
Years in U.S.	0-5 years (ref)								
	6-10 years	1.260	***	0.003	3.525	1.201	***	0.003	3.322
	11-15 years	1.974	***	0.003	7.201	1.932	***	0.003	6.904
	16-20 years	2.484	***	0.003	11.991	2.408	***	0.003	11.115
	21+ years	2.937	***	0.004	18.858	2.861	***	0.004	17.471
Age at immigration		-0.017	***	0.000	0.983	-0.020	***	0.000	0.980
English	No English (ref)								
	Speaks not well	0.652	***	0.003	1.919	0.682	***	0.004	1.978
	Speaks well	1.088	***	0.003	2.968	1.124	***	0.004	3.076
	Speaks very well	1.090	***	0.003	2.975	1.143	***	0.004	3.136
	Speaks only English	0.807	***	0.004	2.241	0.975	***	0.004	2.651
	Less than high school and age 25 over (ref)								
Education	High school	0.305	***	0.002	1.357	0.231	***	0.002	1.260
	Some college	0.439	***	0.002	1.551	0.357	***	0.002	1.429
	BA or associate	0.507	***	0.002	1.661	0.433	***	0.002	1.542
	More than BA	0.312	***	0.003	1.366	0.258	***	0.003	1.295
	Less than \$14,999 (ref)								
Household income	\$15,000-39,999	-0.094	***	0.002	0.911	-0.071	***	0.002	0.931
	\$40,000-74,999	-0.062	***	0.002	0.940	-0.056	***	0.002	0.945
	\$75,000-99,999	0.002		0.003	1.002	-0.008	**	0.003	0.992
	\$100,000 and more	0.003		0.003	1.003	-0.008	**	0.003	0.992
Homeowner Occupation	Owner	0.347	***	0.001	1.415	0.315	***	0.002	1.371
	All others (ref)						***		
	No occupation	-0.179	***	0.004	0.837	-0.172	***	0.004	0.842
	Low odds of being undocumented	0.079	***	0.002	1.082	0.082	***	0.002	1.086
	High odds of being undocumented	-0.268	***	0.002	0.765	-0.215	***	0.002	0.806

**Collective variables**

Percent voting-age naturalized citizens						0.024	***	0.000	1.024
Repressiveness	Free (ref)								
	Partly free					0.225	***	0.002	1.253
	Not free					0.592	***	0.002	1.807
	Missing data					0.056	***	0.006	1.058
Dual citizenship						-0.170	***	0.002	0.844
Absentee policy						-0.102	***	0.002	0.903
Early vote policy						0.030	***	0.002	1.030
Voter ID policy						-0.101	***	0.002	0.904
Safety net	Less available (ref)								
	more available					-0.012	***	0.002	0.988
Receptivity	native receptivity to immigrants					0.012	***	0.001	1.012
Constant		-2.247	***	0.007	0.106	-3.517	***	0.008	0.030
N		653,338							
Model Statistics									
	Model Chi-Square	5,519,658	***			5,828,643	***		
	Goodness of fit	16,584	***			14,091	***		

Notes: a. (ref) means a reference category.

b. Education variables apply only those who are aged 25 and over.

Source: IPUMS (2000)

\* p< .05 \*\*p<.01 \*\*\* p<.001 (two-tailed tests)

**Table 4. Logistic Regression Estimates for Predicting Citizenship Acquisition: Hispanics (2000)**

Individual variables		Model 1				Model 2			
		B	Sig.	S.E.	Exp(B)	B	Sig.	S.E.	Exp(B)
Age	Age 55+ (ref)								
	Age 41-55	-1.130	***	0.008	0.323	-1.076	***	0.008	0.341
	Age 25-40	-1.173	***	0.005	0.309	-1.083	***	0.005	0.339
	Age 18-24	-0.878	***	0.004	0.416	-0.804	***	0.004	0.448
Sex	Female	0.272	***	0.002	1.312	0.258	***	0.002	1.294
Marital status	Married	0.035	***	0.003	1.035	0.041	***	0.003	1.041
Number of children	Number of children	-0.031	***	0.001	0.970	-0.008	***	0.001	0.992
Years in U.S.	0-5 years (ref)								
	6-10 years	0.716	***	0.006	2.046	0.705	***	0.006	2.025
	11-15 years	1.417	***	0.005	4.126	1.419	***	0.005	4.134
	16-20 years	2.066	***	0.006	7.890	2.014	***	0.006	7.490
	21+ years	2.552	***	0.006	12.828	2.492	***	0.006	12.090
Age at immigration	Age at immigration	-0.002	***	0.000	0.998	-0.005	***	0.000	0.995
English	No English (ref)								
	Speaks not well	0.650	***	0.004	1.916	0.659	***	0.004	1.932
	Speaks well	1.188	***	0.004	3.282	1.192	***	0.004	3.294
	Speaks very well	1.298	***	0.004	3.661	1.281	***	0.005	3.600
	Speaks only English	0.990	***	0.005	2.691	0.997	***	0.006	2.711
Education	Less than high school and age 25 over (ref)								
	High school	0.427	***	0.003	1.533	0.331	***	0.003	1.393
	Some college	0.637	***	0.004	1.891	0.523	***	0.004	1.686
	BA or associate	0.787	***	0.004	2.196	0.637	***	0.004	1.891
	More than BA	0.575	***	0.006	1.778	0.411	***	0.006	1.508
Household income	Less than \$14,999 (ref)								
	\$15,000-39,999	-0.076	***	0.003	0.927	-0.052	***	0.003	0.949
	\$40,000-74,999	-0.016	***	0.003	0.984	-0.002		0.004	0.998
	\$75,000-99,999	0.069	***	0.005	1.071	0.066	***	0.005	1.068
	\$100,000 and more	0.086	***	0.005	1.090	0.055	***	0.005	1.057
Homeowner Occupation	Owner	0.395	***	0.002	1.484	0.363	***	0.002	1.437
	All others (ref)								
	No occupation	-0.190	***	0.006	0.827	-0.169	***	0.006	0.844
	Low odds of being undocumented	0.236	***	0.004	1.266	0.226	***	0.004	1.254
	High odds of being undocumented	-0.231	***	0.003	0.794	-0.198	***	0.003	0.821

**Collective Variables**

Isolation						-0.001	***	0.000	0.999
Percent voting-age naturalized citizens						0.019	***	0.000	1.020
Income ratio						0.048	***	0.006	1.049
Repressiveness	Free (ref)								
	Partly free					0.096	***	0.003	1.100
	Not free					0.810	***	0.006	2.248
	Missing data					0.346	***	0.024	1.414
Dual citizenship						0.147	***	0.004	1.159
Absentee policy						-0.140	***	0.003	0.869
Early vote policy						0.073	***	0.005	1.076
Voter ID policy						-0.159	***	0.003	0.853
Latino Representative						-0.051	***	0.003	0.951
Safety net	Less available (ref)								
	more available					-0.037	***	0.004	0.964
Receptivity	native receptivity to immigrants					0.017	***	0.002	1.017
Constant		-2.777	***	0.011	0.062	-3.456	***	0.014	0.032
N		255,907							
Model Statistics									
	Model Chi-Square	1,886,463	***			1,973,886	***		
	Goodness of fit	1,709	***			2,026	***		

Notes: a. (ref) means a reference category.

b. Education variables apply only those who are aged 25 and over.

Source: IPUMS (2000)

\* p< .05 \*\*p<.01 \*\*\* p<.001 (two-tailed tests)

**Table 5. Logistic Regression Estimates for Predicting Citizenship Acquisition: Asians (2000)**

		Model 1				Model 2			
		B	Sig.	S.E.	Exp(B)	B	Sig.	S.E.	Exp(B)
<b>Individual variables</b>									
Age	Age 55+ (ref)								
	Age 41-55	-0.575	***	0.012	0.563	-0.479	***	0.012	0.620
	Age 25-40	-0.726	***	0.008	0.484	-0.732	***	0.009	0.481
	Age 18-24	-0.481	***	0.006	0.618	-0.465	***	0.006	0.628
Sex	Female	0.077	***	0.003	1.080	0.107	***	0.003	1.113
Marital status	Married	-0.010	**	0.004	0.990	0.003		0.004	1.003
Number of children		0.021	***	0.001	1.022	0.008	***	0.001	1.008
Years in U.S.	0-5 years (ref)								
	6-10 years	1.709	***	0.006	5.526	1.634	***	0.006	5.125
	11-15 years	2.674	***	0.006	14.496	2.614	***	0.007	13.648
	16-20 years	3.278	***	0.007	26.535	3.194	***	0.007	24.390
	21+ years	3.935	***	0.008	51.177	3.871	***	0.008	48.004
Age at immigration		-0.007	***	0.000	0.993	-0.007	***	0.000	0.993
English	No English (ref)								
	Speaks not well	0.731	***	0.009	2.077	0.846	***	0.009	2.331
	Speaks well	1.009	***	0.009	2.743	1.208	***	0.009	3.347
	Speaks very well	1.033	***	0.009	2.808	1.301	***	0.009	3.674
	Speaks only English	1.157	***	0.010	3.180	1.508	***	0.010	4.517
Education	Less than high school and age 25 over (ref)								
	High school	0.130	***	0.005	1.139	0.202	***	0.005	1.224
	Some college	0.369	***	0.006	1.447	0.438	***	0.006	1.549
	BA or associate	0.273	***	0.005	1.314	0.371	***	0.005	1.450
	More than BA	-0.147	***	0.006	0.864	-0.019	**	0.006	0.982
Household income	Less than \$14,999 (ref)								
	\$15,000-39,999	-0.061	***	0.005	0.940	-0.075	***	0.005	0.928
	\$40,000-74,999	-0.022	***	0.005	0.978	-0.035	***	0.005	0.966
	\$75,000-99,999	0.082	***	0.006	1.085	0.056	***	0.006	1.058
	\$100,000 and more	0.081	***	0.006	1.085	0.054	***	0.006	1.055
Homeowner	Owner	0.454	***	0.003	1.575	0.412	***	0.003	1.510
Occupation	All others (ref)								
	No occupation	-0.043	***	0.011	0.958	-0.050	***	0.011	0.951
	Low odds of being undocumented	0.105	***	0.004	1.110	0.121	***	0.004	1.128
	High odds of being undocumented	-0.105	***	0.006	0.900	-0.112	***	0.006	0.894

**Collective variables**

Isolation index						0.003	***	0.000	1.003
Percent voting-age naturalized citizens						0.026	***	0.000	1.026
Income ratio						-0.196	***	0.007	0.822
Repressiveness	Free (ref)								
	Partly free					0.071	***	0.006	1.074
	Not free					0.532	***	0.003	1.702
	Missing data					-0.172	***	0.015	0.842
Dual citizenship						-0.195	***	0.009	0.823
Absentee policy						-0.043	***	0.004	0.958
Early vote policy						-0.025	***	0.004	0.975
Voter ID policy						-0.056	***	0.004	0.946
Safety net	Less available (ref)								
	more available					-0.051	***	0.004	0.950
Receptivity	native receptivity to immigrants					0.020	***	0.001	1.020
Constant		-3.100	***	0.019	0.045	-4.628	***	0.021	0.010
N		145,852							
Model Statistics									
	Model Chi-Square	1,404,814	***			1,466,043	***		
	Goodness of fit	2,215	***			773	***		

Notes: a. (ref) means a reference category.

b. Education variables apply only those who are aged 25 and over.

Source: IPUMS (2000)

\* p< .05 \*\*p<.01 \*\*\* p<.001 (two-tailed tests)

**Table 6. Logistic Regression Estimates for Predicting Citizenship Acquisition: Blacks (2000)**

		Model 1				Model 2			
		B	Sig.	S.E.	Exp(B)	B	Sig.	S.E.	Exp(B)
<b>Individual variables</b>									
Age	Age 55+ (ref)								
	Age 41-55	-0.782	***	0.019	0.458	-0.769	***	0.019	0.463
	Age 25-40	-0.878	***	0.013	0.416	-0.852	***	0.013	0.427
	Age 18-24	-0.554	***	0.010	0.575	-0.514	***	0.010	0.598
Sex	Female	0.164	***	0.005	1.178	0.130	***	0.005	1.139
Marital status	Married	-0.003		0.005	0.997	-0.010		0.005	0.990
Number of children		0.039	***	0.002	1.040	0.035	***	0.002	1.036
Years in U.S.	0-5 years (ref)								
	6-10 years	0.982	***	0.010	2.671	0.946	***	0.010	2.577
	11-15 years	1.725	***	0.010	5.613	1.669	***	0.010	5.305
	16-20 years	2.198	***	0.011	9.004	2.121	***	0.011	8.338
	21+ years	2.606	***	0.013	13.539	2.500	***	0.013	12.184
Age at immigration		-0.008	***	0.000	0.992	-0.009	***	0.000	0.991
English	No English (ref)								
	Speaks not well	1.140	***	0.037	3.126	1.140	***	0.037	3.126
	Speaks well	1.724	***	0.036	5.609	1.718	***	0.036	5.576
	Speaks very well	1.723	***	0.036	5.602	1.739	***	0.036	5.692
	Speaks only English	1.824	***	0.035	6.199	1.782	***	0.036	5.943
Education	Less than high school and age 25 over (ref)								
	High school	0.154	***	0.007	1.167	0.141	***	0.007	1.152
	Some college	0.253	***	0.008	1.288	0.257	***	0.008	1.293
	BA or associate	0.374	***	0.008	1.454	0.392	***	0.008	1.480
	More than BA	0.375	***	0.010	1.455	0.419	***	0.010	1.520
Household income	Less than \$14,999 (ref)								
	\$15,000-39,999	0.012		0.007	1.012	0.005		0.007	1.005
	\$40,000-74,999	0.037	***	0.007	1.038	0.008		0.008	1.008
	\$75,000-99,999	0.111	***	0.010	1.117	0.058	***	0.010	1.060
	\$100,000 and more	0.047	***	0.010	1.048	-0.045	***	0.010	0.956
Homeowner	Owner	0.386	***	0.005	1.471	0.327	***	0.005	1.387
Occupation	All others (ref)								
	No occupation	-0.147	***	0.013	0.863	-0.171	***	0.013	0.843
	Low odds of being undocumented	0.105	***	0.005	1.111	0.115	***	0.005	1.122
	High odds of being undocumented	-0.283	***	0.009	0.754	-0.245	***	0.009	0.783

**Collective variables**

Isolation index						-0.001	***	0.000	0.999
Percent voting-age naturalized citizens						0.031	***	0.000	1.032
Income ratio						-0.144	***	0.008	0.866
Repressiveness	Free (ref)								
	Partly free					-0.215	***	0.006	0.806
	Not free					0.091	***	0.008	1.096
	Missing data					-0.264	***	0.011	0.768
Dual citizenship						-0.147	***	0.006	0.864
Absentee policy						-0.001		0.007	0.999
Early vote policy						0.087	***	0.011	1.091
Voter ID policy						-0.047	***	0.006	0.954
Safety net	Less available (ref)								
	more available					-0.152	***	0.008	0.859
Receptivity	native receptivity to immigrants					0.008	**	0.002	1.008
Constant		-3.170	***	0.044	0.042	-4.095	***	0.046	0.017
N		44,843							
Model Statistics									
	Model Chi-Square	301,378	***			330,148	***		
	Goodness of fit	313	***			393	***		

Notes: a. (ref) means a reference category.

b. Education variables apply only those who are aged 25 and over.

Source: IPUMS (2000)

\* p< .05 \*\*p<.01 \*\*\* p<.001 (two-tailed tests)

**Table 7. Logistic Regression Estimates for Predicting Citizenship Acquisition: Whites (2000)**

		Model 1				Model 2			
		B	Sig.	S.E.	Exp(B)	B	Sig.	S.E.	Exp(B)
<b>Individual variables</b>									
Age	Age 55+ (ref)								
	Age 41-55	-1.736	***	0.009	0.176	-1.892	***	0.009	0.151
	Age 25-40	-1.774	***	0.005	0.170	-1.787	***	0.005	0.167
	Age 18-24	-1.072	***	0.004	0.342	-1.075	***	0.004	0.341
Sex	Female	-0.107	***	0.002	0.898	-0.078	***	0.003	0.925
Marital status	Married	-0.011	***	0.003	0.989	-0.025	***	0.003	0.975
Number of children		0.029	***	0.001	1.030	0.008	***	0.001	1.008
Years in U.S.	0-5 years (ref)								
	6-10 years	1.526	***	0.006	4.598	1.442	***	0.006	4.228
	11-15 years	1.992	***	0.006	7.331	1.998	***	0.007	7.372
	16-20 years	2.210	***	0.007	9.114	2.245	***	0.007	9.438
	21+ years	2.605	***	0.007	13.529	2.651	***	0.007	14.168
Age at immigration		-0.039	***	0.000	0.961	-0.042	***	0.000	0.959
English	No English (ref)								
	Speaks not well	0.667	***	0.011	1.948	0.683	***	0.011	1.980
	Speaks well	0.894	***	0.011	2.445	0.959	***	0.011	2.608
	Speaks very well	0.669	***	0.011	1.952	0.846	***	0.011	2.330
	Speaks only English	0.216	***	0.011	1.241	0.594	***	0.011	1.811
Education	Less than high school and age 25 over (ref)								
	High school	0.130	***	0.004	1.139	0.083	***	0.004	1.087
	Some college	0.166	***	0.004	1.180	0.123	***	0.004	1.131
	BA or associate	0.350	***	0.004	1.418	0.258	***	0.004	1.295
	More than BA	0.377	***	0.005	1.457	0.293	***	0.005	1.341
Household income	Less than \$14,999 (ref)								
	\$15,000-39,999	-0.148	***	0.004	0.863	-0.087	***	0.004	0.916
	\$40,000-74,999	-0.224	***	0.004	0.799	-0.150	***	0.004	0.860
	\$75,000-99,999	-0.205	***	0.005	0.815	-0.131	***	0.005	0.877
	\$100,000 and more	-0.151	***	0.005	0.860	-0.071	***	0.005	0.932
Homeowner	Owner	0.150	***	0.003	1.162	0.193	***	0.003	1.213
Occupation	All others (ref)								
	No occupation	-0.171	***	0.010	0.843	-0.207	***	0.010	0.813
	Low odds of being undocumented	-0.065	***	0.003	0.937	-0.049	***	0.003	0.952
	High odds of being undocumented	-0.388	***	0.006	0.679	-0.306	***	0.006	0.736

**Collective variables**

Isolation index						-0.003	***	0.000	0.997
Percent voting-age naturalized citizens						0.023	***	0.000	1.023
Income ratio						-0.428	***	0.010	0.652
Repressiveness	Free (ref)								
	Partly free					0.803	***	0.005	2.231
	Not free					1.003	***	0.004	2.725
	Missing data					0.316	***	0.010	1.371
Dual citizenship						-0.150	***	0.003	0.861
Absentee policy						-0.129	***	0.003	0.879
Early vote policy						0.008	*	0.004	1.008
Voter ID policy						-0.037	***	0.003	0.963
Safety net	Less available (ref)								
	more available					-0.005		0.003	0.995
Receptivity	native receptivity to immigrants					0.006	***	0.001	1.006
Constant		-0.414	***	0.015	0.661	-1.459	***	0.019	0.232
N		206,736							
Model Statistics									
	Model Chi-Square	1,609,492	***			1,737,556	***		
	Goodness of fit	2,501	***			4,959	***		

Notes: a. (ref) means a reference category.

b. Education variables apply only those who are aged 25 and over.

Source: IPUMS (2000)

\* p< .05 \*\*p<.01 \*\*\* p<.001 (two-tailed tests)